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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
DENNIS LOVELESS, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15,511 
This is a criminal appeal where the defendant Dennis 
Loveless was charged with and convicted of the crime of 
aggravated sexual assault pursuant to §76-5-405, U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried on September 14, 1977, before the 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge. The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault, 
a felony in the first degree, pursuant to §76-5-405, U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended). On the 13th day of October, 1977, the 
~onorable J. Duffy Palmer entered judgment and pronounced 
sentence thereon. Judge Palmer sentenced the defendant-
appellant to a term of five years to life in the State 
Pri~on purs1iant to §76-3-203(1) relating to first degree 
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felonies. Defendant-appellant appeals solely from the 
judgment and sentence of the Court and not from the convict: 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant reguests this Court to vacate 
the judgment and sentence of the trial court and to remand 
this matter with directions to enter judgment and pronounce 
its sentence pursuant to §76-3-203(2) relating to a second 
degree felony and not as to a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As appellant is appealing only from the judgment a~ 
sentence of the Court, the facts as to the conduct of the 
i 
appellant regarding this crime are not in issue. Suffice i:l 
I 
to say, that the defendant was charged and convicted by a 
jury of having intercourse with a woman not his wife under 
the age of 14. The indictment was brought under §76-5-405, 
U.C.A., Aggravated Sexual Assault, as the laws of the State 
of Utah stood February 6, 1977. Aggravated sexual assault 
is a felony in the first degree. The sentence of the Court 
was pronounced on the basis of a first degree felony. hl 
that time, the crime of rape, §76-5-402, u.c.A., (1953, as' 
I 
amended), also included the exact conduct with which the 
appellant was charged. Rape was a felony of the seco~ 
degree. Copies of the statutes as they stood in February 
1977 are attached in the appendix. The 1977 session of the 
Utah Legislature amended these two sections to remove this 
inconsistancy. These amendments did not go into affect 
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until after April 1, 1977. Copies of these sections after 
the amendments were made are also attached in the appendix. 
POINT I 
\VHERE THERE ARE TWO STATUTI::S WHICH PROSCRIBE THE SAHE 
CONDUCT BUT IMPOSE DIFFERENT PENALTIES, THE VIOLATOR IS 
ENTITLED TO BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LESSOR 
PENALTY. 
The appellant was charged in the information upon which 
he was convicted with the following specific conduct: 
On or about the 6th day of February, 1977, 
at Farmington, County of Davis, State of 
Utah, the above defendant did have sexual 
intercourse with a female, not his wife, 
to wit: Brenda Winnett, under the age of 
14. ( R. 1). 
The information denominated the crime being charged as 
Aggravated Sexual Assault, pursuant to §76-5-405, U.C.A. 
The conduct described in the information, however, is 
proscribed in identical terms by two separate statutes as 
they existed in February of 1977, when this act took place. 
The two sections are the section on Aggravated Sexual 
Assault, 76-5-405 (Appendix page 1), and the section on 
Rape, 76-5-402 (Appendix page 1). The very words describing 
the defendant's conduct in the information are the words 
used by the rape statute and the consent statute to define 
rape. 7he rape statute, 76-5-402, states: 
A male person commits rape when he has sexual 
intercourse with a female, not his wife, with-
out her consent. 
-3-
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11 \H thout her consent" is defined in ri 76-5-406 ( 7) (ApDendi; 
Page 3), as when: 
(7) The victim is under 14 years of age. 
Rape under these circumstances was a felony in the 
second degree, §76-5-402, U.C.A. 
The exact same conduct was also defined as aggravated 
sexual assault pursuant to 76-5-405, U.C.A. (Appendix page 
The pertinent language from that section is as follows: 
76-5-405 AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT-
( l) A person commits aggravated 
sexual assault if: 
(b) The victim of a rape • 
is under 14 years of age. 
That section, however, describes this conduct as a felony• 1 
the first degree. 
The conduct with which appellant was charged was thus, 1 
prohibited by two statutes in identical terms, one making 1 
the conduct a felony in the second degree, the other makii· 
the conduct a felony in the first degree. There is, of 
course, other conduct defined by the aggravated sexual 
assault statutes which is not included in the rape statute. 
The inforr:iation with which appellant was charged, however,: 
specified none of the additional conduct proscribed by HE 
aggravated sexual assault statute. In fact, the conduct 
described by the infornation used the wording of the rape 
statute and not the wording of the aggravated sexual assac 
statute. 
The law in Utah is clear that where the same condJ. 
proscribed by two statutes which would impose different 
-4-
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penalties, the defendant is entitled to be sentenced 
according to the lesser penalty. The recent Utah case of 
Ra~mell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) states this 
premise clearly. 
Proceeding to the main issue in this case; 
we agree with petitioners premise that 
where there are two statutes which pro-
scribe the same conduct but impose dif-
ferent penalties, the violator is entitled 
to the lesser. 560 P.2d 1108. 
That case dealt with charges under the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act which overlapped to some extent provisions of 
the Pharmacists Act. The Court in that case concluded that 
the conduct proscribed by the one was not identical to the 
conduct proscribed by the other and that the Controlled 
Substances Act applied more specifically to the conduct with 
which the defendant was charged than the Pharmacists Act. 
The Supreme Court also pointed to a provision in the Con-
trolled Substances Act that specifically required the Court 
to apply the Controlled Substances Act when there appeared 
to be any conflict with the Pharmacists Act. 
In the instant case, the conduct with which the defen-
dant is charged is identically proscribed by two statutes. 
One making the conduct a felony in the second degree, the 
other making the conduct a felony in the first degree. When 
the defendant was sentenced, he was sentenced by the trial 
court as follows: 
It is the sentence of the Court that Dennis 
Loveless be committed to the State Peniten-
tiary to serve a period of from 5 years to 
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life. (Transcript, page 9. 'I'he recorcl 
has not been numbered by the Clerk beyond 
the 1st page of the transcript which is 
numbered, record page 8.) 
This sentence was imposed pursuant to §76-3-203(1), U.C.A, 
( 1953, as amended) which states in pertinent part as folio .. 
(1) In the case of a felony of the 
first degree, for a term at not less than 
5 years and which may be for life; 
The sane code section provides the maximum permissible 
penalty for a felony of the second degree as follows: 
(2) In the case of a felony of the 
second degree, for a term at not less than 
1 year nor more than 15; 
The sentence imposed by the trial court could not havi 
been imposed if the Court were sentencing pursuant to the 
second degree felony conviction as required by Rammell v. 
Smith, supra. This Court should remand the case to the 
trial court for re-sentencing as a second degree felo~ 
pursuant to §76-3-203(2). See also State v. Fair, 23 Utah 
2d 34, 465 P.2d 168 (1969) and State v. Shondell, 22 Utahi 
343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969). 
As a post script, it might be noted by the Court that 
in the 1977 session of the Utah State Legislature, the 
duplicate nature of the two offenses, aggravated sexual 
assault, and rape, were corrected. (See Appendix page 21· 
The conduct charged in the information woul.:l now come onlY 
under the rape statute and would no longer fit under the 
aggravated sexual assault statute. The rape statute, 
however, has also been amended to include both first an: 
-6-
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second degree felonies. ?hese amendments took place after 
the date of the conduct with which the appellant is charged. 
CONCLUSION 
The exact conduct with which defendant was charged and 
convicted was proscribed by two separate statutes; one 
:r:ul;ing the conduct a felony in the second degree, the other 
making the conduct a felony in the first degree. The trial 
court sentenced the defendant pursuant to a felony in the 
first degree. The sentence the trial court meaded out would 
not be permissible if it were sentencing pursuant to a 
felony in the second degree. Under these circumstances, 
this Court should remand this case to the trial court for 
re-sentencing pursuant to §76-3-203(2) U.C.A. regarding 
sentences for felonies in the second degree. 
1977. 
Respectfully submitted this 2 ]+h day of December, 
CKS N H 
OWARD, LEWIS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
llAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Steven C. Vanderlinden, Deputy County Attorney, Davis County 
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah 84025, this 27i-~ day of 
IJl·c'('rnl>er, 1977. 
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....., 
From 1973 Pocket part to Volume 8 U.C.A. - In effect u 
nt1 
amendments from 1977 session of J · 1 t Jeg1s a urc> v1ent into e'.:. 
(Sometime after April 1, 1977) . 
. 76-5-402. Rape.-(1) A male person commits rape when he has sexual 
inkrcourse with a female, not his wife, without her consent. 
(2) Rape is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-402, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-402. 
76-5-405. Aggravated sexual assault.-(1) A person corumits aggra· 
vated sexual assault if: 
(a) In the course ·of a rape or attempted rape or forcible sodomy or 
attempted forcible sodomy: 
(i) The actor causes serious bodily injury lo the victim; or 
(ii) The aCtor compels submission to. the rape 01· forcible soclomy 
by threat of kidnapping, death, or serious bodil.Y injury to be in· 
flicted i=inently on any person. · 
(b) The victim of a rape or atternpled rape or sodomy or attempted 
sodomy is under fourteen years of age. 
(2) Aggravated sexual assault is a felony of the first degree. 
History: C. 1953, 7&-5-405, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-405. 
-8-
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From 1977 yellow supplement to Volume 8, U.C.A. In effect 
sometime after April 1, 1977. 
76-5-402. Rape.-(1) A male person commits rape when he bas sexual 
intercourse with a female, not his wife, without her consent. 
(2) Rape is a felony of the second degree unless the victim is under 
the age of 14, in which case the offense is punishable as a felony of the first 
degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-4-02, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-402; L. 1977, ch. 
86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1977 amenJment ndJeil "unles:> the 
victim ~ • • .first degree" to subsec. (2). 
76-5-405. Aggravated sexual assa.ult.-(1) A person commits aggra-
vated sexual assault if: 
(a) In the course of a rape or attempted rape or forcible sodomy or. 
attempted forcible sodomy: 
(i) The actor causes serious bodily injury to the victim; or 
(ii) The actor compels submission to the rape or forcible sodomy 
by threat of kidnaping, death, or serious bodily injury to be in-
flicted imminently on any person. 
(2) AggraYated sexual assault is a felony of the first degree. 
IDstory: C. 1953, 76-5-405, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-405; L. 1977, ch. 
86, § 4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1977 amendment deleted former 
•obd. (I) (b) \<hich read: "The victim of 
a r:'lpe o:- :dtcmpte<l Tilpc or soclomy or 
atteaq)teJ sodomy is under fourteen years 
of f'.g11.' 1 
_Q_ 
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From 1977 yellow supplement to Volume 8, U.C.A. In effect 
prior to date of crime hecein and not amended by 1977 sess. 
of Legislature. 
· 76-5-406. Sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual abuse without consent 
of victim-Circumsta:nces.-An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual 
abuse is without consent of the victim unclel' any of the foUowing circum-
stances: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim to submit or participate by 
force that overcomes such earnest resistance as might reasonably be ex-
pected under the circumstances; or 
(2) The actor compels the '·ictim to submit or participate by any 
threat that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; 
or 
(3) The victim has not consented and the actor knows the v1ctim is 
unconscious, unaware that the aet is occurring, or physically unable to 
resist; or 
(4) The actor knows that as a result of mental disease or defect, the 
victim is at the time of the act incapable either of appraising the nature of 
the act or of resisting it; or 
(5) The actor knows that the victim submits or participates because 
the victim erroneously believes that the actor is the vict.im's spouse; or 
(6) The actor intentionally impaired the power of tlie victim to ap-
praise or control his or her conduct by administering any substance 
without his or her knowledge; or 
(7) The 'ietim is under fourteen years of age. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-406, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-&406. 
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